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COMMENTS
CRACKING DOWN ON COOPERATIVE
BOARD DECISIONS THAT REJECT
APPLICANTS BASED ON RACE: BROOME V.
BIONDI
INTRODUCTION
Cooperative boards generally enjoy broad discretion in their
decisions to accept or reject applicants.' Although cooperative
boards can deny an application for any reason they choose or for
no reason at all, they are prohibited from violating a person's
civil rights.2 An applicant who is rejected based on race can
'See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1322 (N.Y.
1990) (concluding that "[slo long as the board acts for the purposes of the coopera-
tive, within the scope of its authority and in good faith, courts will not substitute
their judgment for the board's"); infra Part L.A (discussing the broad discretion
granted to cooperative boards); see also Rosemarie Maldonado & Robert D. Rose,
The Application of Civil Rights Laws to Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions
of Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting Models of Community-Based Living?,
23 FORDHAA URB. L.J. 1245, 1245 (1996) (explaining that "courts grant cooperative
boards great discretion in the management of their affairs and usually defer to their
decisions when challenged").
The cooperatives bylaws and proprietary lease usually grant the board of direc-
tors the power to accept or reject applicants. See Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants
Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (providing an example of a lease
which stated that the board's consent could not be unreasonably withheld). See gen-
erally 2 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.02[2], at 7-9 (1998) (discussing the
sale and transfer of a cooperative's shares).
See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) (stating
that unless the reason violates a statute that prohibits discrimination, "there is no
reason why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for
themselves with whom they wish to share their elevators, their common halls and
facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their management problems and responsi-
bilities and their homes"); 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, § 7.02[2], at 7-9 to 7-10
(stating that a cooperative board may "grant or withhold consent, for any reason or
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bring a claim of discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing
Act.3 In New York, applicants who believe they have been dis-
criminated against can also bring a claim under section 296(5) of
the New York Human Rights Law.4 Recently, in Broome v. Bi-
ondi,5 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York upheld a jury award of $640,000 for race discrimi-
nation in favor of an interracial married couple against a Man-
hattan cooperative and its board.6
In Broome, Gregory and Shannon Broome, the plaintiffs,
submitted an application to sublet a cooperative apartment
which was rejected! They subsequently filed race discrimination
for no reason," however, "civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in housing
must be complied with"); see also Maldonado & Rose, supra note 1, at 1248-49
(noting that the discretion of cooperative boards is "not absolute" because "courts
draw the line at civil rights violations").
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1994). Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to "refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin." For an example
of a court applying the Act, see Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Coop. Owners,
Inc., 599 F. Supp. 79, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (sustaining a jury verdict against a coop-
erative for violations of the Fair Housing Act). See generally 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, su-
pra note 1, § 7.02[5], at 7-17 to 7-18 (describing the effect of the Act on coopera-
tives).
4 Section 296(5)(a)(1) of the New York Human Rights Law makes it unlawful
"[t]o refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or
group of persons such a housing accommodation because of the race... of such per-
son or persons." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney 1993); see also Bachman
v. State Div. of Human Rights, 481 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (App. Div. 1984) (applying this
statute to housing cooperatives). See generally ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, §
7.02[5], at 7-18 to 7-19 (discussing the New York Human Rights Law and a New
York City law prohibiting housing discrimination).
5 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
See id. at 223, 228-29.
Gregory Broome, an attorney with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, is
African-American. Shannon Broome, his wife, is Caucasian and is an attorney with
General Electric. See Bill Alden, $640,000 Housing Bias Award Upheld, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 7, 1997, at 1.
See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 215. The cooperative apartment was in the
Beekman Hill House, located at 425 East 51st Street in New York City. See id.
When the Broomes discussed the application process with Simone Demou, the
owner of the apartment they wanted to sublet, she explained that prior subtenants
simply completed some paperwork and met with the board's president, Nicholas Bi-
ondi. See Broome v. Biondi, No. 96 CIV. 0805 RLC, 1997 WL 83295, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 1997). Gregory Broome even spoke to Biondi over the telephone, and Biondi
confirmed that the process merely entailed briefly meeting with him. See id. How-
ever, once Biondi saw Gregory Broome in person and learned that he was African-
American, Biondi required the Broomes to meet with the board of directors prior to
granting approval. See id. The day after meeting with the board, the Broomes' ap-
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claims against the cooperative and its board of directors, the de-
fendants, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 3601 to 3619, and
under section 296(5) of the New York Human Rights Law.9 A
jury awarded the Broomes $230,000 in compensatory damages
and $410,000 in punitive damages.'0 The defendants moved for
judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and, alternatively, for
remittitur of the compensatory and punitive damages." These
motions were all denied.u
The defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because the Broomes failed to show they were
"qualified" to sublet the cooperative, which is one of the elements
of a prima facie case of race discrimination in housing. 3  The
court found that the Broomes had satisfied this requirement by
demonstrating their financial capability to rent the apartment.14
In addition, the defendants claimed that the Broomes did not es-
tablish "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimina-
plication was unanimously rejected. See id.
" See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 215; supra notes 3-4 (discussing the Federal
Fair Housing Act and the New York Human Rights Law). Section 1981 states that
"[a]ll persons... shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1982 provides that "[all citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
The Broomes also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress by the
board, but the jury found the defendants not liable for this claim. See Broome, 17 F.
Supp. 2d at 215-16. The defendants in turn filed a counterclaim for defamation, but
the trial judge dismissed it at the close of evidence. See id at 215. Related third
party claims and counterclaims were also filed involving Demou and the cooperative
board. See id&
10 Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
" See id. at 216, 223.
12 See id. at 218-20, 222, 229.
13 Id. at 216. See infra Part I.B, for a discussion of the elements of a prima facie
case of race discrimination. One of the individual defendants, board member Rich-
ard Appleby, also made a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the jury's
finding that he was personally liable for race discrimination. See Broome, 17 F.
Sup?. 2d at 218 n.5. The court denied Appleby's motion. See id.
See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217. To determine whether the Broomes were
qualified, the court relied on Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038
(2d Cir. 1979), and Jiminez v. Southridge Cooperative, Section I, Inc., 626 F. Supp.
732, 734-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), where the courts found that the plaintiffs were
"qualified" if they were "financially able to rent or buy such housing." Broorne, 17 F.
Supp. 2d at 217.
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tion."15 However, the court concluded that such an inference is
created by showing a prima facie case of discrimination. 16  Fi-
nally, the defendants asserted that their motion for judgment as
a matter of law should be granted because the Broomes failed to
prove that the board's stated reasons for the rejection were
"pretextual."7 The court reasoned that the Broomes successfully
demonstrated that the defendants' proffered reasons were not
the "actual" reasons and, therefore, they were pretextual.5 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the defendants were not entitled
to a new trial because the evidence sufficiently supported the
jury's verdict.19 Also, the defendants' motion for remittitur of the
jury verdict was denied because the compensatory and punitive
damages were not found by the court to be excessive or unrea-
sonable. °
,Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
"See id. The court noted that in the second circuit, "a housing discrimination
plaintiff raises an inference of discrimination when he establishes a prima facie
case." Id. (citing United States v. Town Hall Terrace Ass'n, No. 95 CIV 0533E(H),
1997 WL 128353, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997)).
1 Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text,
for a discussion of how the burden of proof shifts between plaintiffs and defendants.
'8 Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18; see also infra Part I.A (discussing the
standard and rationale the court used to determine that the plaintiffs proved that
the defendants' proffered reasons were pretextual).
'9 See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 222. The defendants argued that their motion
for a new trial should be granted because the evidence did not support the jury's
verdict. See id. at 221. The court denied this motion. It concluded that "the jury's
verdict on liability was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence" and there-
fore, that it could not "find that the verdict on liability [was] a miscarriage of jus-
tice." Id. at 222 (citing Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 1978)). In
addition, board member Richard Appleby argued that he was entitled to a new trial
because character testimony that would have shown he was not racially prejudiced
was "improperly excluded." Id. The court denied this motion as well. Id. at 223.
20 Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 223-26, 228-29. In reviewing the compensatory
damages, the court examined evidence of the Broomes' emotional distress and com-
pared their circumstances to those in analogous discrimination cases. See id. at 223-
26. It noted that "the genuine emotional pain associated with [race] discrimination
should not be devalued by unreasonably low compensatory damage awards." Id. at
226. Thus, the court concluded that the emotional damages awarded to the Broomes
were not excessive. See id. The defendants argued that the imposition of punitive
damages was not justified. See id. at 228. The court relied on Ragin v. Harry Mack-
lowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993), however, and stated that punitive
damages can be granted if the "defendants acted ' "wantonly or willfully or were
motivated by ill will, malice, or a desire to injure the plaintiffs." ' " Broome, 17 F.
Supp. 2d at 228 (quoting Ragin, 6 F.3d at 909 (quoting Saunders v. General Servs.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1061 (E.D. Va. 1987))). The court found that the jury could
reasonably find that the defendants acted "willfully or maliciously" and that the
punitive damages awarded were not excessive based on the defendants' conduct.
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The district court properly denied the defendants' motion for
judgment as a matter of law. The court correctly found that the
Broomes established a prima facie case of housing discrimination
which created an inference of discrimination, and that the
board's proffered reasons for the rejection were pretextual. It is
submitted, however, that a stricter standard of analysis of the
board's reasons should have been applied.
Part I of this Comment describes the broad discretion that
cooperative boards have historically enjoyed in accepting and
rejecting applicants, as well as the limits placed on this discre-
tion in cases of civil rights violations. Part II posits that the
court in Broome applied an insufficient standard of review to de-
termine whether the board's proffered reasons for rejecting the
applicants were pretextual. It concludes that the district court
should have adopted a stricter standard of analysis.
I. BROAD DISCRETION OF COOPERATIVE BOARDS
A. The Case Law
While cooperative boards have broad powers regarding ap-
plication decisions, their "discretion is not absolute and unfet-
tered."21 In Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp..,
the court recognized that "the chosen standard of review [for co-
operative board decisions] should not undermine the purposes
for which the residential community and its governing structure
were formed: protection of the interest of the entire community
of residents in an environment managed by the board for the
common benefit."' The court held that the standard of review
for cooperative board decisions should be similar to the business
judgment rule.' Therefore, it concluded that cooperative board
Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 229. The court came to this conclusion by analyzing the
elements set forth by the Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 573-83 (1996), to determine the "reasonableness" of such an award.
Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
21 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, § 7.02[2], at 7-9; see also Maldonado &
Rose, supra note 1, at 1248-49 ("A cooperative board's sweeping powers, however,
are not absolute."); cf. Cavanagh v. 133-22nd St. Jackson Heights, Inc., 666 N.Y.S.2d
702, 703 (App. Div. 1997) (suggesting a situation where an arbitrary exercise of the
board's powers could give rise to a cause of action).
2 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990).
2Id. at 1321.
24 See id. (stating that the standard of review should be "analogous to the busi-
ness judgment rule applied by courts to determine challenges to decisions made by
1999]
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decisions should be accorded deference without judicial inter-
vention provided the board acted "within the scope of its author-
ity and in good faith."" One limitation on a cooperative board's
discretion is that it cannot discriminate against applicants based
on race.
26
B. A Prima Facie Case of Housing Discrimination
To successfully state a claim under the Federal Fair Housing
Act and the New York Human Rights Laws, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination.27 The four
required elements of a prima facie showing are that "(1) the
plaintiff is a member of the class protected by the statute, (2) the
plaintiff sought and was qualified for an apartment... , (3) the
plaintiff was denied the opportunity to rent the apartment...,
and (4) the apartment... remained available thereafter."' In
Broome, the issue was whether the plaintiffs were "qualified" to
rent the apartment. 29 As the court in Broome noted, plaintiffs
can satisfy this element by demonstrating that they have the fi-
nancial ability to rent or buy the housing."0
corporate directors").
2Id. at 1322 (explaining that "[slo long as the board acts for the purposes of the
cooperative, within the scope of its authority and in good faith, courts will not sub-
stitute their judgment for the board's") Id.
26 See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) (stating
that a cooperative board may not violate a statute prohibiting discrimination); see
also 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, § 7.02[2], at 7-10 (explaining that "civil rights
laws that prohibit discrimination in housing must be complied with"); Maldonado &
Rose, supra note 1, at 1256 (noting that the court in Weisner "enhanced the coop-
erative board's discretion over share transfers by approving the arbitrary withhold-
ing of consent by the board, absent a violation of discrimination laws").
27 See Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that in
order to prevail the plaintiffs must first set forth a prima facie case by establishing
four elements); Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that "these laws required the [plaintiffs] to make a prima facie case of housing dis-
critnination").
28 Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 381 (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 506 (1993)); see also Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1979) (comparing housing discrimination suits to employment discrimination
suits). In Robinson, the court noted that a plaintiff asserting housing discrimination
makes a prima facie showing by establishing: "(1) that he is Black; (2) that he ap-
plied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing, (3) that he was rejected;
and (4) that the housing opportunity remained available." Id.
2Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 216. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
o See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217; see also Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1038
(discussing the elements of a prima facie showing of discrimination and noting that
it was sufficient that the plaintiff "could afford to purchase the space sought").
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In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff raises an inference of dis-
crimination by establishing a prima facie case.3' Therefore, once
a plaintiff has demonstrated these four elements, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to rebut the assertion of discrimi-
nation.32 To do this, the defendant must give a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the rejection," at which time the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that the offered reason is
"pretextual.""
31 See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217; see also Soules v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that a housing
discrimination plaintiff has to "allege 'only discriminatory effect, and need not show
that the decision complained of was made with discriminatory intent.'! (quoting
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1217 (2d Cir. 1987))).
For some courts, a change in procedure in the application process made specifi-
cally for the plaintiff may be enough to establish an inference of discrimination. For
example, in Robinson, the defendant shareholders organized a "screening commit-
tee" for the plaintiff who was African-American, and used the "previous informal
procedure" for a potential Caucasian purchaser. Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1039. The
court in Robinson determined that this change in procedure created "a conclusion of
discriminatory motive well within the realm of legitimate inference." Id. at 1039.
Furthermore, the court discussed using the "motivation test" to establish a prima
facie case as an alternative to showing the four elements, which it referred to as the
"effects test." Id at 1038; see also Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp., 674 F. Supp.
440, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[The court enjoins defendants from imposing any new
requirements... upon class member applicants as conditions to their securing
apartments."); Maldonado & Rose, supra note 1, at 1278-81 (analyzing cases where
the courts determined that a change in procedure during the application process for
a member of a protected class suggested discrimination). ln Broome, there was a
change in procedure. See supra note 8 (describing how the president of the board in
Broome altered the application process for the plaintiffs). In fact, Simone Demou's
testimony at trial characterized this change in procedure as an "unprecedented re-
quirement for the approval process." Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
2 See Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1039; Huertas, 674 F. Supp. at 454 (stating that
once the plaintiffs meet their burden, the defendant must prove that reasons other
than race were involved in turning down the plaintiffs application); Sassower v.
Field, 752 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing the shifting of the burden
of proof).
See Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1039 ("The burden shifts to the defendant to come
forward with evidence to show that his actions were not motivated by considerations
of race."); Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217 ("At trial, the Beekman defendants had the
burden of rebutting any inference of housing discrimination by proffering a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.") (citing Soules, 967 F.2d at 822).
Soules, 967 F.2d at 822 ("If the defendant does come forward with evidence in
his defense, we allow a plaintiff an opportunity to show that a defendant's stated
reason for denying the plaintiffs application for housing was pretextual."); Broome,
17 F. Supp. 2d at 217 ("Once a defendant articulates a reason for his actions, the
burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the articulated reason was a pretext
for housing discrimination.") (citing Soules, 967 F.2d at 822); Sassower, 752 F. Supp.
at 1189 (explaining how the "burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the defendants' stated reasons were not their real reasons but were.., only a pre-
1999]
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II. PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN IN PROVING A REASON IS PRETEXTUAL
A. The Standard Adopted in Broome v. Biondi
The standard applied by the court in Broome to ascertain
whether the defendants' proffered reasons for rejecting the ap-
plicants were pretextual was merely whether they were the
"actual" reasons. 5  The only other guideline articulated by the
court is that when making this determination " 'a fact-finder
need not, and indeed should not evaluate whether a defendant's
stated purpose is unwise or unreasonable.' "" The defendants
stated that they declined to accept the Broomes' application be-
cause " 'they perceived them as confrontational and litigious,'
and believed Demou [the owner of the apartment] was trying to
intimidate [the board] into accepting the Broomes as subtenants
by raising charges of racism."37 The jury concluded that the de-
fendants' reasons were pretextual, and the court held that the
evidence supported this decision. 8
text for discrimination"); see also infra Part II (describing this shift in the burden of
proof back to plaintiff to show a proffered reason is pretextual).
35 See Broome, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 217 ("ITihe decision should be based on
whether the proffered reason is the actual reason for the challenged action.") (citing
Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988)).
"' Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir.
1993)).
37 Id. (quoting Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 14-15, Broome (No. 96 CIV.
0805RLC). Simone Demou became a third party defendant when the president of
the Beekman Hill House, Biondi, sued her for defamation and injurious falsehood.
See id. at 215. Demou counterclaimed against the Beekman defendants claiming re-
taliation under section 3617 of the Federal Fair Housing Act, sections 296(5) and (7)
of the New York Human Rights Law, and under the New York City Administrative
Code sections 8-107(5) and (7). Demou also counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, and tortious interference with the performance of a con-
tract. See id. The court dismissed the retaliation claim under the New York City
Administrative Code, but allowed the other claims to stand, for which the jury
awarded damages to Demou. See id.
38 See id. at 217. The evidence cited by the court as supporting the jury finding
included that the Broomes denied stating they would sue, and that the board did not
check any of their references to discover whether they would make "good tenants."
Id. Furthermore, the board members discussed race when making their decision. Id.
at 218. One board member, Lawrence Weiner, noted on the Broomes' application
that Gregory Broome was a "black man." Id. Another board member, Richard Ap-
pleby, actually asked the Broomes whether they would sue or whether they felt dis-
criminated against based on race. See id.
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B. A Suggested Stricter Standard for Evaluating Proffered
Reasons
While the Broome court applied the "actual" reasons stan-
dard, other courts have held defendants to a stricter standard,
making it easier for plaintiffs to prove that the defendants' rea-
sons are pretextual. 39 In Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 40 the
Second Circuit sets forth an alternative standard.4 First, it dis-
tinguishes between objective and subjective reasons.42 It entails
"carefully scrutiniz[ing"4  subjective proffered reasons "with
considerable skepticism.'  Additionally, "racial motivation
[must] not play any role in the decision" to reject the applicant.45
Furthermore, special attention must be paid "to recognize means
that are subtle and explanations that are synthetic.'"
It is submitted that the court in Broome should have used
the Robinson standard. This standard makes it easier for a
plaintiff to prove that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by
the defendant is a pretext.4' For example, in Robinson, the coop-
39 See Soules, 967 F.2d at 822 (discussing the importance of "view[ing] skepti-
cally subjective rationales"); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1040
(stating that a careful look into reasons for rejection is required); cf Stuart S.
Moskowitz, Cooperative Apartments: The Enforceability of Transfer Restrictions and
the Impact of Bankruptcy, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 142 (1989) (giving a general back-
ground on how cooperatives function in context of bankruptcy issues). While not
specifically discussing the pretext issue, Moskowitz does address how courts are im-
posing a stricter standard and points out that, "a number of New York courts...
have begun to scrutinize the actions of cooperative boards." Id. at 150.
40 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
41 See id- at 1040-43.
42 See id. at 1039-41; see also Maldonado & Rose, supra note 1, at 1256-58
(explaining that objective reasons receive "greater judicial deference" whereas sub-
jective reasons "trigger[ I] more intense judicial scrutiny and hinder[ ] the coopera-
tive's chances for success").
Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1040 ("In evaluating the proposed justifications, the
district court must carefully scrutinize suggested reasons that are not objective in
nature.").
4Id. ("In cases in which discriminatory intent could be inferred from the se-
quence of events, the courts have generally viewed subjective explanations with
considerable skepticism."); see also Soules, 967 F.2d at 822 ("In examining the de-
fendant's reason, we view skeptically subjective rationales concerning why he de-
nied housing to members of protected groups.").
Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1043; see also Irizarry v. 120 West 70th Owners Corp.,
No. 86 CIV. 3503 (JFK), 1986 WL 8073, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986) ("In order to
rule against the plaintiff, the trial court must find a total absence of any racial mo-
tivation on the part of the defendants.").
4 Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1043.
47 But see Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying the Robinson standard, but concluding that, although the
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erative board stated that it rejected the plaintiff, who was Afri-
can American, because he showed "animosity" during the inter-
view and because it had been informed of a rumor about con-
struction he planned to do that would damage another
apartment." The Second Circuit determined that the applicant
was denied the apartment based on subjective factors.49 The
court remanded the case and concluded that unless the board
members testified to an "adequate justification" for the rejection,
the applicant would be entitled to injunctive relief. 0
Similarly, the court in Irizarry v. 120 West 70th Owners
Corp.51 also concluded that the cooperative board's proffered rea-
sons were pretextual, even though they were objective.52 The
board claimed that it rejected an interracial couple, a Hispanic
man, and a Caucasian woman, because it thought that only his
cooperative board's reasons for rejecting an Irish applicant-that she was
"unresponsive" and "vague" during the interview-were subjective, they were not
"subtle or synthetic"). In Murphy, the cooperative's by-laws provided that it would
not unreasonably withhold consent to transfer shares. See id. at 1155. The court
found that the subjective reasons given by the board were inadequate under this
provision, and granted injunctive relief to the applicant. See id. at 1156; see also
Smolinsky v. 46 Rampasture Owners, Inc., 646 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1996)
(affirming a verdict against a cooperative where the proprietary lease stated that
the board could not unreasonably withhold consent); 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note
1, § 7.02[2], at 7-11 (describing the New York rule that, if a cooperative's proprietary
lease specifies that the board cannot "unreasonably" refuse to transfer or assign
shares, the courts will "strictly scrutinize" the rejection).
48 Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1035-36. The rumor was that the applicant wanted to
have plumbing put in by placing a waste line through the floor of the apartment and
along the ceiling of the apartment below. See id. at 1035.See id. at 1039.
60 Id. at 1040. This case was before the Second Circuit on plaintiffs appeal from
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. See id.
51 No. 86 CIV. 3503 (JFK), 1986 WL 8073 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986).
52 See id. at *6. Usually, if a cooperative board's decision is seemingly based on
an objective reason, the board will prevail. See Maldonado & Rose, supra note 1, at
1260 (explaining that "the honest assertion of objective factors is the surest defense
for cooperatives"). Examples of objective factors include "(a) financial responsibil-
ity[,] (b) the 'identity' or 'business character' of the subtenant, including suitability
for the particular building[,] (c) legality of the proposed use[, and] (d) nature of the
occupancy." Kruger v. Page Management Co., 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 302 (Sup. Ct. 1980),
quoted in Murphy, 579 F. Supp. at 1156.
For instance, in Jiminez v. Southridge Cooperative, Section I, Inc., 626 F. Supp.
732 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the cooperative board rejected a Hispanic man's application
because he did not work for the same employer for at least a year and was not fi-
nancially qualified. See id. at 734. The court determined that the cooperative board
offered a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action." Id. at 735. However,
the court concluded that even though the plaintiff did not prove the proffered reason
was pretextual, he was nonetheless entitled to a jury trial. See id. at 735-36.
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name would be on the stock shares, and he did not have suffi-
cient funds.5 The court applied the Robinson standard, to find
that the board's proffered reasons were "synthetic."'
The court in Broome did not separate subjective and objec-
tive reasons, and thus failed to explain the significance of exam-ining subjective reasons with greater scrutiny. Even though the
plaintiffs in this case were able to recover, to prevent cooperative
boards from disguising discrimination, it is imperative that
courts recognize the importance of carefully reviewing proffered
reasons. As another court noted, "clever men may easily conceal
their motivations."55 By simply stating that the given reasons
had to be the "actual" ones, the Broome court did not provide
sufficient guidelines for future determinations. Had the court
properly adopted the Robinson standard, the proffered reasons of
cooperative boards in later cases would be subject to the stricter
standard of review " they deserve.
CONCLUSION
Cooperative boards have enjoyed broad discretion, making it
quite difficult for applicants to successfully prove that their
housing applications were rejected because of racial discrimina-
tion. 7 The decision in Broome is significant because it is "one of
0 See Irizarry, 1986 WL 8073, at *3-*4. The board was aware of the male appli-
cant's race because he had noted on his application that he belonged to a Hispanic
society. Id. at *2.
'AId. at *5-*6. The court determined that the evidence showed the board had
known that the couple planned to marry, that both names would be on the stock
shares, and that the applicants were financially qualified. See id. at *3, *6.
0 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)
(holding, in a racial discrimination case, that local government is not immune to the
provisions of the Fair Housing Act and that "[elffect, and not motivation, is the
touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their motivations"); see
also Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1043 (recognizing that cooperatives are being more dis-
creet in formulating their reasons behind denying applications).
r See 2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, § 7.02[2], at 7-11.
' See Maldonado & Ros% supra note 1, at 1282 (noting that it is difficult to
prove discrimination because such claims generally rely on circumstantial evidence).
It has been observed that:
Critics of co-op boards have long maintained that decisions to accept or re-
ject tenants are often arbitrary and at times based on factors like race. Al-
though race-based rejection is illegal, it has been difficult to prove that
such decisions occur since co-op boards have great powers under the law to
reject tenants and do not have to explain why they turn someone down.
Benjamin Weiser, A Co-op Must Pay $640,000 for Denying Sublet to Black, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1997, at Al.
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the few such cases to succeed against a co-op, and it la[ys] bare
what some critics of co-op boards say is a common practice." 8
The court, however, did more than just hold that the applicants
established a prima facie showing of housing discrimination and
successfully showed that the board's proffered reasons were pre-
textual. The jury verdict sustained by the court "is thought to be
the largest verdict in a racial discrimination case against a
Manhattan co-op and its board."59
The standard of analysis courts should apply in deciding
whether a cooperative board's reasons for rejecting an applicant
are pretextual is the standard articulated in Robinson v. 12 Lofts
Realty, Inc.6° Housing discrimination claims are difficult to
prove and are easily thwarted by cooperative boards as long as
they offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. Thus, it
is important for courts to apply a stricter standard of review
than what has been previously used in analyzing a cooperative
board's proffered reasons. To ensure that cooperative boards are
not hiding behind fabricated subjective reasons to cover up race
discrimination, the proffered reasons must be more closely exam-
ined than the court did in Broome. While awarding substantial
money damages assists in compensating victims of housing dis-
crimination, the predominant goal is to prevent the discrimina-
tion from occurring. Considerable amounts of punitive damages
are one way to hinder future discriminatory acts, and the em-
ployment of a stricter standard of review of the proffered reasons
for rejections is another.
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